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JUSTIFYING ASSISTED SUICIDE: COMMENTS ON
THE ONGOING DEBATE
MELVIN I. UROFSKI*
If the right to control the time and manner of one's
death-the right to shape one's death in the most humane
and dignified manner one chooses-is well founded, how
can it be denied to someone simply because she is unable
to perform the final act herself?
-Yale Kamisarl
On the last day of the term in June 1997, the Supreme Court
handed down its decisions in two cases involving physician-
assisted suicide. The Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and endorsed by all the other justices, held that
neither history nor jurisprudence supported the claim of a con-
stitutional right to assisted suicide.2 The results did not surprise
anyone, since the conservative majority that has held sway since
the early 90s has been loathe to create new constitutionally pro-
tected rights. What did astonish legal scholars and advocacy
groups was the fact that five members of the Court wrote sepa-
rate concurrences that practically amounted to dissents.' In
effect, they said that they would go along with this cautious
approach for now, but should states make end-of-life choices too
narrow, they would be willing to revisit the issue. Justice Souter,
in an extremely sensitive and well-reasoned opinion, indicated
how the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
allows for the development of new rights, and intimated that
assisted suicide might well come under that rubric in the future.4
If one believes, as I do, that there is a constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy-"the most comprehensive of rights and
* Professor of Constitutional History and Public Policy, Virginia Com-
monwealth University; Ph.D., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1983, University
of Virginia. The author wishes to thank Leslie Rezac Urofsky for research assist-
ance on this article.
1. Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 32, 35.
2. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 521
U.S. 793 (1997).
3. The five were Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
4. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752.
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the right most valued by civilized men" 5-then one must ques-
tion the majority's reasoning and conclusion. The Court, in its
last major abortion case, noted that matters "involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."6 Certainly
there are few things in one's life that can be considered more
intimate and personal than how one chooses to die, either by
letting nature take its course or by hastening the end through
direct or indirect means.
This article looks first of all at the law as it now stands
regarding the right to die in general, and assisted suicide in par-
ticular. Part II looks at the ethical issues that are part of the
debate, and Part III discusses the public policy questions that our
society will have to grapple with as it comes to terms with an
aging population, rising health costs, a medical technology that
can keep very sick, indeed comatose patients, "alive," and a cul-
ture in which the quality of life is important to many people.
To meet "truth in advertising" criteria, let me state at the
outset that I favor not only the right of people to end medical
treatment even if that will lead to death (the right to die), but I
also support, under appropriate safeguards, the right of persons
who are terminally ill to end their lives and to have assistance to
that end. As to the larger question of suicide for non-terminally
persons, like most people I find that a most difficult and dis-
turbing issue, but one that is, to a large extent, not apposite to
the matter at hand.
In any good discussion of law or ethics, one starts with
hypotheticals-"what ifs"-and tries to draw out principled
answers. Let me provide the following examples of people who
were sick, suffered greatly, and had they not acted would in any
case have died sooner rather than later, and let us see if there are
any principled ways of differentiating among them.
1. Adam, sixty-three years old, suffered from amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), commonly called Lou Gehrig's disease, a
progressive deterioration and hardening of the spinal cord lead-
ing to loss of muscle control and, ultimately, paralysis. Adam
relied on a respirator to sustain his breathing, but while his body
was ravaged his mind remained clear. He knew that if taken off
the respirator he would die within a few hours; with the respira-
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
6. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
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tor he might continue to live for another two years. An active
man all his life, Adam hated this existence, which he saw as no
life at all. After talking to his family, Adam, with their support,
informed his doctor that he wished to be taken off the respirator.
The doctor acceded to his wishes, and with his family at his side,
Adam died.'
2. Barbara, in her late fifties, had an inoperable brain
tumor, with a prognosis of increasing pain, loss of emotional con-
trol, and dementia before death. Barbara had always been an
outgoing person, cherished by her friends for her wit and
humor. Rather than face this grim scenario of deterioration, she
asked her husband to get her a gun, and one morning after her
family had left the house, she shot herself.
3. Carole had contracted uterine cancer, which had rapidly
metastisized, and she was in great and constant pain. When
admitted to the hospital she was placed, with her full consent
and knowledge of the consequences, on a morphine drip to alle-
viate the pain. As the cancer spread and the pain increased, her
doctor increased the morphine level, and five days after entering
the hospital she died. The death certificate listed cancer as the
cause of death, but in fact she died from an overdose of
morphine.
4. Diane with the help of her family doctor had overcome
alcoholism and depression, and just when she thought she could
begin to enjoy life again, she was diagnosed with acute leukemia.
Although her doctor recommended chemotherapy and a bone-
marrow transplant, Diane's own research led her to believe-cor-
rectly-that these painful treatments had little chance of success.
Rather than go through with them, she wanted to die when the
pain became too much. Her doctor prescribed barbituates for
her insomnia, and told her very explicitly how many pills consti-
tuted a lethal dose. After she had taken the pills, her husband
called the doctor to the house; he listed leukemia as the cause of
death.8
5. Edward also suffered from ALS, and his condition had
deteriorated to the point that he was confined to a wheelchair
and had practically no control over his body; his hands lay immo-
bile on the wheelchair tray. Edward's greatest fear was that he
would choke to death on his own saliva. He could not take pills
7. This hypothetical is based on the story of Abe Perlmutter. See Staz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
8. This example is, of course, the "Diane" described in Timothy E. Quill,
Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
691 (1991).
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nor shoot a gun, and since he was not in great pain nor near
death, he did not qualify for a morphine drip. At his request,
and with the support of his family, a doctor gave him a lethal
injection.9
All of these people died, arguably before their allotted time,
and to some extent at their own hands. They made the decision
to unplug the ventilator, pull the trigger, go on a morphine drip,
take the pills or have a physician administer a lethal dose. One
might think that all of these people committed suicide, and in a
profound way that is true; they caused their own deaths. But
both law and ethics treat these cases differently. Adam died, at
least according to the law, not from unplugging his ventilator but
from the underlying illness. Barbara is the only true suicide, at
least by the legal definition. Common sense would tell us that
Carole benefited from physician-assisted suicide, but the courts
have held that so-called "palliative medication," even if it leads to
death, is neither murder nor assisted suicide; rather death is an
unintended consequence of the doctor's primary purpose, allevi-
ating pain. Diane is a true case of physician-assisted suicide, in
that although the doctor nominally prescribed the barbiturates
for insomnia, he knew why Diane wanted the pills, and he made
sure she knew what constituted a lethal dose. And Edward,
according to the law, had been murdered, for which act the doc-
tor stood trial and was found guilty.
The results in all the hypotheticals are the same: a person in
great pain and suffering ended that pain and suffering. In each
instance that person had to have the help of someone else-to
turn off the machinery, buy a gun, provide the medication,
administer it. Yet law and ethics as well as social policy draw sig-




The modern law on right to die derives from both common
law and constitutional sources. It has long been an axiom of the
common law that people need not take medication or treatment
against their will, even if that decision may lead to dire conse-
quences. In a nearly century-old tort case still studied by first-
year law students, a Minnesota court ruled that, in the absence of
9. On November 22, 1998, 60 Minutes aired a videotape of Dr. Jack Kevor-
kian administering a lethal injection to Thomas Youk, aged 52, who suffered
from ALS. Youk requested Kevorkian to do this and Youk's family supported
his decision.
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an emergency, a doctor could not perform a procedure unau-
thorized by the patient. "If the operation was performed without
the plaintiff's consent, and the circumstances were not such as to
justify its performance without, it was wrongful; and if it was
wrongful, it was unlawful."1 A decade later Benjamin Cardozo
ruled that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."1'
The common law did not so much speak to a right to die as to
individual autonomy, the control a person has over his or her
own body against unwanted action. A person must consent to
treatment, but may also refuse, even if that refusal leads to death.
A personal right, it need not conform to what a majority of soci-
ety thinks the person ought to do.
12
On the constitutional side, one can begin with the right to
privacy, first enunciated by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olm-
stead," endorsed by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 4 and later expanded in the first abortion
case, Roe v. Wade. 5 In these cases, the Court held that a person's
privacy right included control over one's bodily autonomy, and
while never mentioning right to die, one can infer that a decision
to refuse or terminate treatment would surely be included within
this rubric. Certainly the New Jersey Supreme Court thought so
when it heard the first major right to die case in modern times,
In re Quinlan.6
When studying the legal aspects of the right to die, one
often starts with Karen Ann Quinlan, in which a NewJersey court
granted to her parents the right to remove their comatose
daughter from life-support equipment. But as Peter Filene has
shown, the question of right to die had become popularized well
before Quinlan. Starting in the mid-fifties, with the publication
of Lael Wertenbaker's Death of a Man, in which she told how she
helped her sick husband kill himself, a veritable explosion of
books and articles about death, euthanasia and bereavement
appeared. Between 1968 and 1973 the number of articles about
death in popular magazines doubled each year, and then
between 1973 and 1975 doubled again. A bibliographer listed
10. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905).
11. Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
12. See In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1015 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dissenting).
13. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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1,200 books on death and bereavement that appeared between
1935 and 1968; in the next five years another 1,200 were pub-
lished.17 All this, it should be noted, happened before Karen
Quinlan's case caught public attention. Perhaps the case caused
as much of a furor as it did because the public already knew a
great deal about death and dying, subjects once considered
taboo for polite conversation.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, state courts reaffirmed the
notion that a competent person, voluntarily making a knowl-
edgeable decision, had the legal right to refuse or terminate
treatment.18 In addition, state courts also recognized the use of
advanced directives, or living wills, by which a competent person
could direct what medical treatment he or she wanted or did not
want in the future.19 Following Quinlan, the idea of a living will
caught on rapidly, and at present all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of advance directive statute."0
Although state courts have consistently upheld the validity of
these state statutes,21 not all patients have living wills, and even
when they do, not all doctors and hospitals are willing to abide by
the instructions.22 In response to demands for greater patient
autonomy, in October 1990, Congress passed the Patient Self-
Determination Act.2" The law went into effect in December
1991, and requires all hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid
funds to provide entering patients written information about
their rights under applicable state law to accept or refuse medical
treatment, as well as their right to formulate advance directives
and durable powers of attorney. In addition, hospitals must note
17. See PETER G. FiLENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS: A HISTORY OF THE
RIGHT-TO-DIE IN AMERCA 49 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Eichner v. Dillon, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
19. An Illinois attorney is normally given credit for proposing a formal
advance directive. See Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A
Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
20. For an evaluation of the different state laws, see ChristopherJ. Con-
die, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105
(1988); Shari Lobe, The Will to Die: Survey of State Living Will Legislation and Case
Law, 9 PROB. L.J. 47 (1989).
21. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921
(Fla. 1984); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); Saunders v. State, 492
N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
22. For a particularly egregious example, see Englebert L. Schucking,
Death at a New York Hospital, LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Dec. 1985, at 261.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f) (I), 1396a(a) (2000).
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in each patient's records whether or not an advanced directive
has been provided, and to train their staffs on the subject.24
The federal law did not affect the rights of states to establish
evidentiary and procedural standards in their own laws, and not
all states follow the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,
which is generally liberal in its provisions for proving individual
wishes. Missouri, for example, has a higher evidentiary standard,
and that led to the first and so far only right-to-die case to come
before the U.S. Supreme Court, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health.25
B.
The facts of the Cruzan case are well-known by now, and
need be rehearsed only briefly. Coming home from work one
night in January 1983, twenty-five-year-old Nancy Beth Cruzan
lost control of her car on an icy road near Carthage, Missouri.
The car turned over, and she was thrown out some thirty-five feet
face down into an icy ditch. Emergency help came promptly, but
not soon enough. The rescue squad resuscitated the young
woman, but her brain had been deprived of oxygen too long.
Like Karen Ann Quinlan, Cruzan never regained consciousness
and sank into a persistent, vegetative state. Unlike Quinlan, she
could breathe on her own, but for seven years lay curled in a fetal
position in the Missouri Rehabilitation Center in Mount Vernon,
kept alive by a tube inserted into her stomach to provide nutri-
ents and water. She had been a healthy person before the acci-
dent, and doctors said she might live like this for another thirty
years. Her parents finally gave up hope that she would regain
consciousness, and went into court to have the feeding tube
removed.26
24. There are no studies as to how effective this has been. However, in
Michigan, a jury awarded Brenda Young and her family $16.5 million in a suit
against Genesys St. Joseph Hospital for ignoring Ms. Young's directions that she
not be put on a ventilator. After Ms. Young suffered a series of seizures while in
the hospital, doctors put her on life support, saving her life, but leaving her in
in the kind of existence she had feared and wanted to avoid. She now needs
around-the-clock attendance, is mentally incompetent, has little control over
her bodily functions, and must be tied to the bed to prevent her from hurting
herself. See Tamar Lewin, Ignoring 'Right to Die' Directives, Medical Community is
Being Sued, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1996, at Al.
25. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
26. Although the American Medical Association and many medical
ethicists consider artificial feeding and hydration a medical treatment that, like
a ventilator, can be withdrawn from a terminally ill person, the idea horrifies
many people. Food and water, even through a tube, are seen as the basic neces-
sities of life, and evoke a far more emotional response than do respirators.
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The Cruzans went into local probate court, and if Nancy had
been a minor, her parents would have had the authority to act on
their own. Judge Robert E. Teel appointed a guardian, Thad C.
McCanse, to represent Nancy's interests, and McCanse agreed
with the parents that the feeding tube should be withdrawn.
Judge Teel granted the Cruzans' request, but Missouri Attorney
General, William L. Webster, decided to appeal the decision. He
claimed that under Missouri law, there had to be clear and con-
vincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan had earlier indicated that
she wanted all medical assistance terminated. The Missouri
Supreme Court, by a four to three vote, agreed with Webster that
the Cruzans had not met the evidentiary level;27 the Cruzans
appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision for the Court was
extremely cautious, but the majority ruled that as part of per-
sonal autonomy, there exists a constitutionally protected right to
die. The opinion emphasized that this right did not derive from
any right to privacy, but from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. "The principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."28
The key word is competent, however, and the Court noted that
this is an area normally assigned to state jurisdiction, not federal
law. Although only two other states, New York and Maine,
required the same higher standard as Missouri, under a federal
system a state's powerful interest in protecting life gives it the
authority to establish such a test, provided it does not unduly
burden the individual's constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est. The Chief Justice found that Missouri's standards met that
test.
29
The element of the opinion that most disturbed right-to-die
advocates and civil libertarians was Rehnquist's discussion of bal-
ancing an individual's liberty interest against opposing state con-
cerns. Declaring that a liberty interest exists, according to the
ChiefJustice, merely begins the judicial inquiry; courts must then
determine whether the liberty interest outweighs the claims of
the state. Rehnquist seemed to indicate that courts need do no
27. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
28. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990) (administering antipsychotic medication to a prisoner); Parham v.J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979) (involuntary confinement of a child for medical treat-
ment); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (a state's interest in
preventing disease trumps an individual's interest in refusing a smallpox
vaccination)).
29. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-82.
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more than apply a simple rational basis test, the lowest standard
of constitutional review, in weighing individual interests against
state concerns. Moreover, the burden of proof rests upon the
family of an incompetent to "prove" that the patient, if compe-
tent and able to make his or her wishes known, would want to
have treatment stopped.
Despite the several opinions,30 two things stand out in the
case. The Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged a con-
stitutionally protected right to die and grounded it in the liberty
interests of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Second, the Court did not see it as an absolute right, but allowed
states great leeway in establishing appropriate procedures to gov-
ern that particular end-of-life choice. Even Justice Scalia, the
least sympathetic of the justices to a federally protected right,
concurred with the majority's ruling; he would have allowed the
right, but set it within the context of state rather than federal law.
C.
At about the same time as the Court handed down its decree
in Cruzan, and before the meaning of the decision and its impact
could be analyzed, the legal, ethical and public policy debate was
pushed to a new level by an unlikely protagonist, a retired
pathologist who not only believed in the right-to-die, but in the
right of people to commit suicide and to have help doing so. On
June 4, 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian hooked up fifty-four-year-old
Janet Adkins, a Portland, Oregon, school teacher suffering from
early stages of Alzheimer's disease, to his so-called "mercy
machine." Over the next several years Kevorkian reportedly
helped more than one-hundred people die,3' and focused
national attention on the whole issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide. The following year, Dr. Timothy Quill, a doctor in Roches-
ter, New York, discussed a practice he said many doctors engaged
in secretly: helping their terminally ill patients die. Unlike
Kevorkian, who barely knew the people he helped die, Quill had
had a long professional relationship with "Diane," and under-
stood and grieved with her over her condition.32 Both Quill and
Kevorkian raised the interesting legal points of what constituted
assisted suicide and whether it could be punished.
30. For a discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions, see Mel-
vin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, 32 U.
RICH. L. REv. 313, 323-25 (1998). None of the justices opposed a right-to-die,
but differed on how far they would go in protecting it.
31. See Lawyer Puts Kevorkian Cases at "Nearly 100", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1997, at A21.
32. See Quill, supra note 8, at 691.
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Many American states initially adopted the English rule of
considering suicide a criminal act, a practice that dated back to
the tenth century when King Alfred ruled a suicide's property
would be forfeit to his feudal lord. Somewhat later the rule
changed so that the suicide's estate would be forfeit to the crown.
In order to justify this change, the royal courts noted that every
felon forfeited goods to the king, and so by making suicide a
felony, this general rule would apply. In Hales v. Petit,3 the court
classified suicide as a felony and condemned self-murder as a
criminal act. That being the case, then assistance in a criminal
act would be a crime as well as even attempting the act. The first
known case of legal punishment of assisted suicide occurred in
1854, in which the judge held the criminality of attempted sui-
cide a self-evident truth.3 4 In modern times the public and legal
attitude toward suicide has changed, and today no jurisdiction in
the United States makes suicide a crime. At worst, a failed
attempt may lead to mandated therapy or perhaps incarceration
in a mental hospital. But nowhere is it legal for doctors or any-
one else to assist in suicide. Forty-four states, the District of
Columbia, and two territories prohibit or condemn assisting sui-
cide. 5 In April 1997, President Clinton signed into law the Fed-
eral Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act,36 prohibiting the
use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide.
Given this legal bias against assisted suicide, as well as the grow-
ing notion of a right-to-die, inevitably advocates of the latter
would take the logical step of attacking the former.
D.
The attack took place on both coasts. In the State of Wash-
ington, an organization called Compassion in Dying, five physi-
cians, as well as three dying patients who wanted doctors to help
them die challenged the state statute that held a "person is guilty
of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids
another person to attempt suicide."3 7 Promoting suicide in
Washington is a class C felony punishable by imprisonment for
up to five years and by a fine of up to $10,000.8 The Washington
33. 75 E.R. 398 (1562). Not until the Suicide Act of 1961 did Her Maj-
esty's Government finally stop making suicide or its attempt a crime.
34. See Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox 453 (1854).
35. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 847 (9th Cir.
1996) (Beezer, J., dissenting). A list of the statutes can be found in Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 775 n.14 (1997).
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-08 (2000).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1988).
38. See id. §§ 9A.36.060(2), 9A.20.020(1)(c).
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law had been on the books in one form or another since 1854
but had rarely been enforced. Even Compassion in Dying, while
apparently operating in violation of the statute, had never been
threatened with prosecution.39 Washington, it should be noted,
had no law prohibiting or criminalizing suicide or attempted
suicide.
On the east coast, Timothy Quill and two other doctors
launched an attack in July 1994 to have New York's ban on
assisted suicide declared unconstitutional. Three terminally ill
patients also were plaintiffs, but all of them died before the case
went to trial, leaving only the physician plaintiffs. The New York
Penal Code provides that "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when . . . [h] e intentionally ... aids another
person to commit suicide. ' 4' A person "is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he intentionally.., aids another person to
attempt suicide."4 '
The west coast plaintiffs won in the district court,4 2 initially
lost in the court of appeals,4" and then in a rare grant of rehear-
ing, won before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc.44 By an eight to three vote, the appeals court found that
the Washington statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. On the east coast, the challengers to the
New York law lost before the district court,45 then won on appeal
in the court of appeals.46 The Second Circuit ruled that the New
York statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, in that the
judges could see little difference between assisted suicide and the
termination of treatment.
With both the Second and Ninth Circuits in agreement on
the results, if not the reasoning, there seemed little reason for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari except to overturn the rul-
ings. Moreover, in recent years the justices seem intent on cut-
ting down the docket, and have been fairly stingy in accepting
cases. Nonetheless, the Court granted certiorari to both cases at
the beginning of October 1996 Term, heard oral argument on
January 8, 1997, and handed down their decisions on June 26th,
39. See Timothy Egan, Federal Judge Says Ban on Assisted Suicide is Unconsti-
tutiona4 N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at Al, A24.
40. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1965).
41. Id. § 120.30.
42. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash.1994).
43. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
44. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
45. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
46. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the last day of the term. Their finding, that the Constitution did
not provide a right to physician-assisted suicide, did not surprise
anyone, although the fact that all of the justices agreed with this
result did raise a few eyebrows.
The results in the two cases are far from straightforward,
despite the Chief Justice's opinions for the Court. Five justices,
even while agreeing with the result, filed concurring opinions
that raised many questions, and left the door open for future
challenges to laws prohibiting assisted suicide.47 The three jus-
tices in Cruzan who would have found a stronger liberty inter-
est-Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun-had left the bench, and
the centrists who had taken their place shared the view that the
Court had to be careful in finding new rights. As in Cruzan,
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinions.
E.
In Glucksberg, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's claim
that physician assisted suicide constituted a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Rehnquist found
that neither history nor tradition yielded support for the proposi-
tion that assistance in suicide had ever been considered a per-
sonal right, and "for over 700 years, the Anglo-American
common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of
both suicide and assisting suicide."4" The recent trend away from
the common law's harsh sanctions reflected not an acceptance of
suicide but rather a belief that the suicide's family should not be
punished for his wrongdoing. As for assisting suicide, the various
states had in recent years re-examined and generally reaffirmed
the ban. "Despite changes in medical technology and not with-
standing an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life
decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this prohibition."4
As for the constitutional claims, Rehnquist agreed that the
Due Process Clause protects more than fair process, and the lib-
erty "it protects includes more than the absence of physical
restraint."' He ticked off a long list of cases in which the Court
had found fundamental rights and interests, but "we 'ha[ve]
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
47. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
48. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
49. Id. at 719.
50. Id. (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
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this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended." 5 ' The Court's
established due process analysis involves determining whether
the claimed liberty interest is "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition,"52 and whether there is a "careful descrip-
tion" of the asserted liberty interest.53
Having disposed of any historical claim, the Court also
rejected the respondents' claim that the liberty interest in
assisted suicide was consistent with the Court's long line of due
process decisions enumerating rights protected under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Rehnquist went into an extended analysis
of the state's interest in preventing suicide, and found all of
them convincing-preservation of human life,54 protecting the
integrity of the medical profession, 5 protecting vulnerable
groups such as the poor and the elderly,56 and fear of a slippery
slope, that permitting assisted suicide will lead to voluntary and
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.5 1 In the Court's opinion,
all of these interests were legitimate, and "Washington's ban on
assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion
and protection. "58
In conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that "[t]hroughout
the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-
assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as
it should in a democratic society."5 Despite the fact that states
had traditionally opposed assisted suicide, nothing in the Court's
opinion was intended to foreclose them from changing their
minds. The decision followed almost precisely the prescription
laid out by Professor Cass Sunstein: an opinion that did not con-
stitutionalize a right to assisted suicide, did not foreclose that as
an option for the states, and continued the democratic
dialogue.60
In the companion case of Vacco v. Quill, Rehnquist took less
than seven pages to overturn the Second Circuit, in part because
he did not find it necessary to reiterate his lengthy historical
51. Id. at 720 (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
52. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
53. Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
54. See id. at 728-29.
55. See id. at 731.
56. See id. at 731-32.
57. See id. at 732-33.
58. Id. at 735.
59. Id.
60. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123 (1997).
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analysis from the Ninth Circuit opinion. He began his analysis by
noting that facially, New York's ban on assisted suicide and its
statutes permitting patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment do
not "treat [ ] anyone differently from anyone else or draw [ ] any
distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical
condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide."61 In
general, according to the Chief Justice, "laws that apply even-
handedly to all 'unquestionably comply' with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."
6 2
Since logic and practice supported New York's judgment
that a clear and important distinction existed between allowing a
patient to die and making that patient die, the state could there-
fore treat these two groups of patients differently without violat-
ing the Constitution. In conclusion, the Chief Justice reiterated
what he saw as important state interests-prohibiting intentional
killing; preserving life; protecting the role of physician as healer;
sheltering vulnerable people from abuse, prejudice, and finan-
cial pressure to end their lives; and "avoiding a possible slide
toward euthanasia"-all discussed in Glucksburg.6" "These valid
and important public interests easily satisfy the constitutional
requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational rela-
tion to some legitimate end."'
F.
The concurring opinions are, in many ways, more interest-
ing and nuanced than the majority decisions in which the Chief
Justice took such a narrow approach. The most important is the
eighteen-page opinion by Justice David Souter, which, I believe,
may prove far more influential in future constitutional litigation
than the simplistic majority view. Souter explored the history of
substantive due process from the early days of the Republic to its
repudiation after its abuse by conservatives attacking economic
regulation.6" But substantive due process had been used to
defend individual liberties as well as property rights, and here
Souter clearly considered Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent
in Poe v. Ullman66 the most important statement of the type of
rights subsumed within due process. Souter listed three ele-
61. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 800 (citing New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
587 (1979)).
63. Id. at 809.
64. Id.
65. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752, 756-62 (SouterJ., concurring).
66. 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ments of that opinion necessary to any analysis of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests. First, he noted Harlan's "respect
for the tradition of substantive due process review," and the
necessity for the courts to undertake that review.67 The very text
of the Due Process Clause, Souter concluded, imposes on the
courts "nothing less than an obligation to give substantive con-
tent to the words 'liberty' and 'due process of law.' "68
Harlan's second point was that the purpose of such review
"is not the identification of extratextual absolutes but scrutiny of
a legislative resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing princi-
ples, each quite possibly worthy in and of itself, but each to be
weighed within the history of our values as a people."69 The
Court must weigh the strengths of opposing claims and not sub-
stitute its judgment based on what the justices see as first prem-
ises; they cannot substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature, unless that body has exceeded clear constitutional
parameters. This led to Harlan's third point, the necessity to pay
attention to detail as an element no less essential than under-
standing the positions of the competing sides or recognizing the
extent of legislative judgment.
Souter undertook this analysis, I believe, because he found
the majority opinion devoid of compassion or awareness of the
claims of terminally ill patients. The majority had said there was
no historic basis for recognizing assisted suicide as a liberty inter-
est, and therefore no liberty interest existed. Souter understood
that due process had been used in the past to create or at least to
recognize hitherto latent rights.7" While not ready to create a
right to assisted suicide, he wanted to acknowledge that even if
the legislature was well within its powers to make the choice it
did, and even if judicial deference required the courts to respect
that decision, those seeking the right also had a claim. Courts
needed to hear this claim even if they did not agree with it.
Courts had "to assess the relative 'weights' or dignities of the
contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is
familiar to the common law."7" But in doing so, courts had to be
careful to confine any liberty interests they recognized to those
that truly deserved constitutional stature, those "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."72 Courts also had to remember that their business
67. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 763.
68. Id. at 764.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 763.
71. Id. at 767.
72. Id. at 768 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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involved constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking. Thus
judges had to review the competing claims carefully with great
attention to detail, but they had no right to substitute their pref-
erences for those of the legislative branch. Justice Harlan had set
clear standards for courts to follow in due process review, a path
that on the one hand avoided the arbitrariness of absolutes and
on the other stood firm against making simple reasonableness a
standard for declaring rights.
With these standards in mind, Souter now turned to the
issue before the Court, and framed the question in very limited
terms. "[H]ere we are faced with an individual claim not to a
right on the part of just anyone to help anyone else commit sui-
cide under any circumstances, but to the right of a narrow class
to help others also in a narrow class under a set of limited cir-
cumstances."7" To this claim the state responds "that rights of
such narrow scope cannot be recognized without jeopardy to
individuals whom the State may concededly protect through its
regulations."74
Souter's analysis of the patient and doctor claim showed far
greater sensitivity to nuance than did the majority opinion. The
respondents did not base their claim on history, but in fact
acknowledged that historically there had been prohibitions. The
lesson of history was not that suicide had at one time been con-
sidered a criminal act, but rather that it had long since been
decriminalized. But Souter refused to follow the respondents'
argument that this opened the door to requiring the decriminal-
ization of assisting in suicide. The reasons for decriminalization
of suicide may have had far more to do with the practical ability
of the state to prevent such acts than any change in popular
moral views. "Thus it may indeed make sense for the State to
take its hands off suicide as such, while continuing to prohibit
the sort of assistance that would make its commission easier. '7
5
Decriminalization by itself did not imply the existence of any
constitutional right or liberty interest.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the respondents had made
much of the Court's analysis of bodily autonomy in Casey, and
Souter acknowledged that analogies existed between the abor-
tion cases and those dealing with assisted suicide, most impor-
tantly, the need for a doctor in both instances. Without a
doctor's assistance in abortion, "the woman's right would have
too often amounted to nothing more than a right to self-mutila-
73. Id. at 773.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 777.
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tion, and without a physician to assist in the suicide of the dying,
the patient's right will often be confined to crude methods of
causing death, most shocking and painful to the decedent's
survivors."7 6
Souter also agreed that one could make a strong case that
physician-assisted suicide fell within "the accepted tradition of
medical care in our society."77 In the abortion cases the Court
recognized the need for a doctor, and not just to perform the
medical procedure. The Court "recognized that the good physi-
cian is not just a mechanic of the human body whose services
have no bearing on a person's moral choices, but one who does
more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient.
78
The idea of the physician treating the whole person is just as
important in end of life decisions as in abortion. The patients in
this case wanted not only to end their pain (which Souter noted
they might have done although only at the price of stupor), "but
an end to their short remaining lives with a dignity that they
believed would be denied them by powerful pain medication, as
well as by their consciousness of dependency and helplessness as
they approached death. 79 One could hardly imagine any other
circumstances in which the call for bodily autonomy carried
greater weight, and in which the role of the physician, including
assistance, fell within the "traditional norm" of health care. In
fact, the state had already recognized this right in its willingness
to allow terminally ill patients to stop treatment and to withdraw
life-sustaining medication, thus hastening death. It also allows
physicians to administer powerful pain-killing medication to ter-
minally ill patients, even if such dosages bring on death.
Up until this point one might have thought Souter had pre-
pared a dissent rather than a concurrence. He summed up the
respondents' arguments as going through "three steps of increas-
ing forcefulness." First, the decriminalization of suicide; second,
this decriminalization provides freedom of choices analogous to
individual options in recognized areas of bodily autonomy, such
as abortion; and third, the claim for assistance is not based on
some broad principle but rather on the traditional role of doc-
tors in ministering to all the medical needs of their patients.
This was a powerful argument, Souter noted, one demanding
76. Id. at 778.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 779 (referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, at 153 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
79. Id.
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under the Poe criteria "careful scrutiny of the State's contrary
claim."80
Souter then proceeded to do just that. The State had essen-
tially put forward three interests to justify its law-protecting life
generally, discouraging suicide (even if knowing and voluntary),
and protecting terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide or
from euthanasia. Souter found it unnecessary to discuss the first
two, since the third argument proved dispositive for him. The
State had argued that a very slippery slope existed, and that it
would be all too easy, perhaps inevitable, to progress down that
slope:
[M] istaken decisions may result from inadequate palliative
care or a terminal prognosis that turns out to be error;
coercion and abuse may stem from the large medical bills
that family members cannot bear or unreimbursed hospi-
tals decline to shoulder. Voluntary and involuntary eutha-
nasia may result once doctors are authorized to prescribe
lethal medication in the first instance, for they might find
it pointless to distinguish between patients who administer
their own fatal drugs and those who wish not to, and their
compassion for those who suffer may obscure the distinc-
tion between those who ask for death and those who may
be unable to request it."1
Here, unlike the majority opinion, is found not only the suf-
fering of the individual patient, but also the concerns of a com-
passionate state. The Chief Justice had found the state interests
rational and the history opposed to assisted suicide, and there is
barely a hint of the individual-patient or doctor-who must live
within this system with no recourse. Souter seemed to imply that
should conditions change, the Court might also reconsider. The
example of the Netherlands, where fairly strict regulation exists,
had been invoked by both sides, the respondents to support their
claim that strong rules would prevent abuse, the state to prove
that euthanasia had gotten out of control. Souter took the mid-
dle route, and the one supported by the bulk of the evidence,
namely, that "a substantial dispute" existed about what the Dutch
experience meant.8 2 While that dispute might someday be
resolved, until it was there existed enough evidence to support
the state's concern about legitimizing assisted suicide. "The day
may come when we can say with some assurance which side is
right [in what the Dutch practice means], but for now it is the
80. Id. at 782.
81. Id at 782-83.
82. Id. at 786.
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substantiality of the factual disagreement, and the alternatives for
resolving it, that matter. They are, for me, dispositive of the due
process claim at this time."
8 3
Given this dispute, Souter would defer to the legislative judg-
ment, but added that there was still much learning to be done on
the subject. For the moment the legislature was as well suited as
the judiciary to undertake that examination. Moreover, in
declaring constitutional rights, courts ought to act with finality
and cannot experiment with what might or might not be done
under differing circumstances:
Legislature, however, are not so constrained. The experi-
mentation that should be out of the question in constitu-
tional adjudication displacing legislative judgment is
entirely proper, as well as highly desirable, when the legis-
lative power addresses an emerging issue like assisted sui-
cide .... While I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institu-
tional competence as the better one to deal with that claim
at this time.
8 4
Souter's is, I suggest, a far better opinion than that of the
majority. The latter is rigid and formulaic, with barely a hint of
the great emotional issues involved: the pain and suffering of
individuals and their families, the moral dilemmas of doctors, the
effect on society. Souter is cognizant of these matters, and if he
cannot give those in pain the answer they want, he at least
acknowledges that they have a legitimate claim and that mere
recourse to history is an evasion rather than an answer. And he
clearly leaves the door open for the Court to revisit this matter,
even as he urges the states to grapple further with it.
G.
The other concurrences, although much shorter, also
reflected the justices' discomfort with the simplistic majority
view. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the only justice to file a con-
currence who also signed onto the Court's opinion, wrote an
opinion that also implied that given another set of factual cir-
cumstances and claims, she too would be willing to reconsider
the decision. The majority had framed the issue fairly narrowly,
and she agreed "that there is no generalized right to 'commit
suicide."' 8' 5 Respondents, however, had asked the Court to
address a narrower question: whether a mentally competent per-
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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son experiencing great pain and suffering has a constitutionally
protected right to control the circumstances of his or her immi-
nent death?
This claim need not be reached in either case, O'Connor
noted, because such people could already get the relief they
sought. "The parties and amici agree that in these States a
patient who is suffering from terminal illness and who is exper-
iencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication,
from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the
point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death."86 Given
this fact, she saw no reason why the state should not be allowed
to pursue its legitimate interests in protecting those not truly
competent or whose decisions might not be truly voluntary.
What O'Connor left unsaid was what she would do were the
states to change that situation and, in their efforts to protect
those needing protection, impinged upon the ability of the com-
petent to gain this relief. She urged the states to continue in
their "extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted sui-
cide and other related issues," because "[e]very one of us at some
point may be affected by our own or a family member's terminal
illness." 7
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg noted briefly that she con-
curred in the judgments in the two cases, "substantially for the
reasons stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion."8
Justice Stephen Breyer also joined in O'Connor's concurrence,
but not insofar as it joined in the majority reasoning. Breyer
agreed with the majority that the critical question is whether a
liberty interest exists under the Fourteenth Amendment to sup-
port the respondents' claim. But he differed with the Court on
how it formulated that right, namely, a right to commit suicide
with another's assistance. Breyer said he would not reject the
claim without considering a different wording which might have
greater support within the American legal tradition. "That for-
mulation would use words roughly like a 'right to die with dig-
nity.' But irrespective of the exact words used, at its core would
lie personal control over the manner of death, professional medi-
cal assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physi-
cal suffering-combined."8 9
The lone member of the Cruzan minority still sitting on the
Court, John Paul Stevens, also concurred in the judgment. The
86. Id. at 736-37.
87. Id. at 737.
88. Id. at 736 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 790 (BreyerJ., concurring).
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majority had noted that its holding remained consistent with the
ongoing debate over the morality, legality and practicality of phy-
sician-assisted suicide; Stevens wrote separately "to make it clear
that there is also room for further debate about the limits that
the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the
practice."90 While Stevens agreed that there is no absolute right
to physician-assisted suicide, he believed that Cruzan meant that
people who were at death's door had "a constitutionally pro-
tected interest that may outweigh the State's interest in preserv-
ing life at all costs."91 Stevens believed that in such situations, the
liberty interest was different from and far stronger than the com-
mon law rule and also trumped any state interest. "It is an inter-
est in deciding how, rather than whether, a critical threshold
shall be crossed."
92
Stevens concurred in the New York case because he did
believe a difference existed between letting someone die and has-
tening that person's death, and in the Washington case because
he did not think a broad liberty interest existed. But he, like
Souter, O'Connor, Ginsberg and Breyer, did not believe the
issue definitively resolved. Like them, he also encouraged the
states to experiment and explore the issue further, but there is
no question that he too wanted to keep the door to the Court
ajar.
II.
If one read only the Chief Justice's majority opinion, one
might be forgiven for thinking that the moral repulsion of sui-
cide is widespread, and that there is only one side in the ethical
debate, namely a universal condemnation of self-murder. In fact,
library shelves are full of religious tracts, scholarly monographs
and popular journals and books that take an astonishing variety
of moral and ethical positions on suicide.9" It is not my intent to
get involved in this debate, other than to state the obvious: if one
believes, from the standpoint of a particular religious system or
from a structured ethical base, that suicide is wrong, then clearly
assisted suicide is also wrong. I have no argument with these peo-
90. Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 745.
92. Id.
93. For a survey of moral arguments concerning suicide, see, for exam-
ple, MARGARET PABST BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE (1995); TOM L
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed.
1994). English and American practices, as well as changing popular attitudes,
are described in HoWARD J. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED
LAND: A PSYCHOCULTURAL BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SUICIDE (1989).
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ple, other than to ask that they not impose their religious/ethical
beliefs on others who do not share them.
However, the obverse is not as clear-cut. Even if one believes
in complete individual autonomy, that does not necessarily mean
that all suicides are justifiable, or that assisting suicide is logically
or ethically permissible. One has to have some guidelines, and
because the law is involved, these guidelines have to be suffi-
ciently clear and constant so that fact-finders and law-finders can
make consistent rulings.
A.
Let us begin by distinguishing between assisted suicide and
euthanasia, a term that for many people conjures up images of
Nazis putting the elderly, the sick, the retarded and the disabled
to death. Until relatively recently, euthanasia had little to do
with doctors, but referred to the experience of the dying person.
Doctors, according to the original code of ethics of the American
Medical Association, had the obligation to comfort their patients
and when possible to revive them.94 The state of medical knowl-
edge in the mid-nineteenth century, however, led most doctors
to believe they should let nature take its course. They might pre-
scribe a cordial, probably an opium derivative, to ease the pain,
and because they had ministered not only to the patient but to
the family, they joined in the death watch and did what they
could to comfort the living. Because nearly everyone died at
home in those days, we have no data on just what doctors actually
did, but the anecdotal evidence is that many doctors saw it as
their duty to relieve the pain, even to the point of causing their
patient's death. As one doctor told a public symposium in 1913,
"Others have assumed the responsibility which I myself have
taken in more than one case, of producing euthanasia."9
Whether doctors acted on their own, or acceded to the
wishes of the patient and family, is impossible to tell, but we can
surmise that what we now call physician-assisted suicide took
place in at least some instances. Doctors who could do little
except relieve pain might well acquiesce to a patient's desire to
end all suffering. In some ways, modem advocates of physician-
assisted suicide want to return, not to the state of medical knowl-
edge in the nineteenth century, but to a condition in which
patients can look for a good death and expect help from the
doctors whom they have known and trusted for years.
94. See Harold Y. Vanderpool, Doctors and the Dying of Patients in American
History, in PHYSICIAN-AssISTED SUICIDE 35 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1997).
95. FiLENE, supra note 17, at 4.
JUSTIFYING ASSISTED SUICIDE
If we adopt the modern terminology, however, euthanasia
often refers to the act of one party upon another, a doctor, for
example, causing the death of a patient, albeit for a benevolent
purpose, to end the patient's suffering. We differentiate between
"passive" euthanasia, in which actions that might prevent death
are not taken, and "active" euthanasia, in which an action is
deliberately taken for the purpose of causing death. When the
action or the failure to act is undertaken at the wishes of the
patient, it is called "voluntary." The euthanasia of an incompe-
tent person is referred to as "involuntary" or "nonvoluntary."
For some people, there is major factual and ethical, as well
as legal, difference between assisted suicide and euthanasia. The
doctor who writes a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates
is considered less involved-and responsible-for the patient's
death than if she administers the medicine herself. With assisted
suicide, the patient takes his or her own life-the "Diane" of our
hypotheticals-and advocates of individual autonomy believe this
is a preferable option, one that allows the individual to retain the
fullest control. The role of the doctor is to give the patient the
widest range of choices, but not to make the decision. The doc-
tor may hope, for example, that the patient will change his mind,
but in any case, there is clearly less legal liability in prescribing
medication that may lead to death and actually administering a
lethal dose. As Howard Brody put it:
There are psychological reasons to prefer patient control
over physician-assisted lethal injection whenever possible.
The normal human response to facing the last moment
before death, when one has control over the choice, ought
to be ambivalence. The bottle of pills allows full recogni-
tion and expression of ambivalence: I, the patient, can
sleep on it, and the pills will still be there in the morning.
I do not lose my means of escape through the delay. But if
I am terminally ill of cancer in the Netherlands and sum-
mon my family physician to my house to administer the
fatal dose, I am powerfully motivated to deny any ambiva-
lence I may feel.96
Admittedly, some people do not draw any distinction
between assisted suicide and euthanasia, and believe there is no
justification for trying to differentiate as a basis for formulating
policy.97 True, the end result is the same, but leaving the final
96. Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to Medical Fail-
ure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1386 (1992).
97. See, e.g., G.C. Graber & J. Chassman, Assisted Suicide Is Not Voluntay
Active Euthanasia, But It's Awfully Close, 41 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y. 88 (1993).
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decision in the hands of the patient increases personal autonomy
and may provide legal as well as psychological defense for the
physician.
B.
Personal autonomy is one of the most highly valued aspects
of a democratic society, and nowhere more so than in the United
States. Here both the culture as well as the law support the
notion that liberty exists and is justified by giving individuals the
right to make personal choices regarding fundamental values.
But we are not a society of libertarians, oblivious of responsibili-
ties to others, and a continuing thread through the debate over
the right to die is what do people who want to die owe to others
and to society as a whole. More specifically, how does a desire to
end one's life fit into a social context that reverences human life?
Proponents of assisted suicide argue that respect for the
individual requires that we not only allow them to choose death,
but to have assistance if necessary in carrying out that wish.
(Here again, let me emphasize that we are not talking about
emotionally deranged or disturbed persons, the teenager who
did not get asked to the prom or the guy who has been diag-
nosed as clinically depressed. Obviously, seriously ill people will
be depressed, and that is normal, but they can function, they can
make rational and knowing decisions. There are few people who
would deny that for a person suffering from advanced stages of
AIDS or cancer, who is in great pain, and who knows that death
is not a question of "if" or even of "when" but of "how soon,"
ending one's life may be a very rational decision.) One need not
argue for an unlimited right of suicide to recognize that in
appropriate cases, suicide can be not only a logical but perhaps
even the only way to end great suffering and maintain one's
human dignity.
It is true that in some instances pain can be alleviated, and
in extreme instances there is the morphine drip, but for many
people the price of reduced pain is the loss of control, the end-
ing of the way they want to live their lives. The writer Anna Quin-
dlan perhaps put it best when she wrote that "[p]ain
management and hospice care are better than ever before. But
for some people they are simply the trees. The forest is that they
no longer want to live, and they believe the decision to die
belongs to them alone.""8
98. Anna Quindlan, Death: The Best Seller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at
A19.
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But what about the obligation of the individual to society?
How can one square a right to assisted suicide with a social pref-
erence for life? Putting religion aside, there are many people for
whom taking life is a violation of deeply held ethical principles,
and suicide is not a liberty but the worst form of license. "Like
the 'freedom' to sell oneself into slavery, the freedom to end
one's life should be limited for the sake of freedom."99 Euthana-
sia seems to make a mockery of all the customs and laws we have
erected to protect life, including the ban on murder.
Daniel Callahan, a founder of the Hastings Institute, is one
of the most articulate opponents of assisted suicide and cham-
pion of the community needs over individual desires in this
area.1 °° Callahan has little use for the autonomy argument, and
considers it over-valued. In an interesting attack, he argues that
in assisted suicide, the individual is in fact giving up autonomy,
since he is handing over his life into the absolute control of
another, and he compares it to slavery. This absolute power, he
claims, "is not compatible with respect for our human dignity,"
since even in the name of mercy it gives one person an absolute
power over another.10 1 He quotes approvingly Joel Feinberg's
comment
there is no such thing as "trivial interference" with per-
sonal sovereignty; nor is it simply another value to be
weighed in cost-benefit comparison. In this respect, if not
others, a trivial interference with sovereignty is like a minor
invasion of virginity: the logic of each concept is such that
a value is respected in its entirety or not at all.
10 2
With all due respect, this is little more than casuistry. While
it is certainly true that we cannot sell ourselves into slavery
(although at one time that was not only possible but permissi-
ble), I do not give up my autonomy if I seek help to accomplish
something I desperately want but am unable to do by myself. By
this argument, it would appear that it is all right for me to com-
mit suicide providing I do not involve anyone else, for example, I
go out to the gun store, purchase a shotgun, load it, put the bar-
rel in my mouth, and pull the trigger. I have thus kept my "sover-
eignty." That this might be a horrible death, that it might cause
great pain to people I love, seems to be irrelevant. People who
99. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 88 (1994).
100. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHtAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE (1993).
101. Daniel Callahan, "Aid-in-Dying": The Social Dimensions, in COMMON-
wEAL 476 (1991).
102. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 448, 492 (1983).
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are seriously ill have already had their "sovereignty" compro-
mised. They can no longer do all they want; they may not even
have complete or perhaps even partial control over their bodies.
Their autonomy is not reduced if someone helps them to die and
to end their suffering.
C.
Aside from their objections to an individual taking his life,
opponents of assisted suicide also fear the effects it will have
upon the medical profession. For two millennia doctors have
taken the oath of Hippocrates, and even if they no longer swear
to the god Apollo, they still adhere to a ethos that they will do no
harm to patients nor "give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for
it, nor ... make a suggestion to this effect." The official position
of the American Medical Association is that "physician-assisted
suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as
healer."1 °3 Medical ethicists and others worry that if the doctor
becomes a dispenser of death, this will adversely affect the doc-
tor-patient relationship, destroying the trust that is essential to
good care. As one group of doctors put it: "If physicians become
killers or are even merely licensed to kill, the profession-and,
therefore, each individual physician-will never again be worthy
of trust and respect as healer and comforter and protector of life
in all its frailty.'
10 4
(There is, one should note, an on-going debate over the role
of doctors in the execution of prisoners condemned to death.
Several states have adopted lethal injection as a more humane
form of execution than the electric chair, and have typically
turned to physicians to set up the intravenous tube and inject the
combination of substances. While some doctors and ethicists see
this as completely opposed to the very essence of medicine, the
saving of life, others justify it as a humane response to an
extraordinary circumstance. If doctors do not perform this act it
will be done by those who are not trained, errors will occur, and
instead of a humane death one will have a butchery.10 5)
103. AMA, CODE OF ETHICS Rule 2.211 (1994). However, polls of doctors
show them to be greatly divided on this issue, with only a minority favoring the
AMA official position. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 749 n.12
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing studies on this issue).
104. W. Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill, 259 JAMA 21, 39-40 (1988).
105. See AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician Participa-
tion in Capital Punishment, 270 JAMA 365 (1993); Erich H. Loewy, Healing and
Killing, Harming and Not Harming: Physician Participation in Euthanasia and Capi-
tal Punishment, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHIcs 29 (1992).
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Critics worry not only about physicians as healers, but also as
individual moral agents. If sanctioned to carry out euthanasia,
then they must have independent moral grounds to kill others.
If a patient asks a doctor to help her die because her life has
become one unending round of pain and she is no longer able
to do any of the things that mattered to her, is the doctor to
make an independent judgment at this point or merely to accept
what the patient tells him? The degree to which people suffer
from pain varies enormously; three patients with identical condi-
tions may react in three different ways. What is the obligation of
the doctor to seek other forms of therapy, perhaps aggressive
pain treatment? Doctors in the Netherlands agree that the most
difficult aspect in euthanasia is that there is no objective way of
judging patient claims regarding pain. Given the recent empha-
sis on patient rights and self-determination, will doctors simply
abandon independent moral or even medical judgments and
simply agree to patient demands for death? Will they, in effect,
become moral cripples?1 °6
But what is a doctor's obligation to her patient? In general,
one expects that a physician will do all that can be done to cure
an illness, repair an injury, and mitigate pain. But what happens
when the illness is incurable, when the injury is beyond repair,
and when the level of pain thwarts the most potent medicines in
our modern pharmacopoeia? In this case, if the patient wants to
end the suffering by ending life, does the doctor have an obliga-
tion to help if that would be in the patient's best interests?
There are doctors and medical ethicists who take this posi-
tion, and believe that like the old-fashioned family doctors, mod-
ern physicians have to treat the whole patient, and do what is in
the best interests of the patient. For a doctor to seriously discuss
suicide as an alternative, and be willing to assist if necessary,
would demonstrate a commitment to the patient's well-being
right up until the moment of death. Certainly there is no indica-
tion that doctors in the Netherlands have lost the respect of their
patients; rather, they are seen as trusted friends of the family,
who stay with a patient in the final moments. Nor do they appear
as moral cripples to themselves, their patients or society.
Doctors who, for whatever reason, choose not participate in
assisted suicide need not do so, providing they are open and up-
front about their position. Some doctors will not perform abor-
tions, even though the Supreme Court has held that a woman's
106. See Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 1992, at 52-53.
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right to abort is constitutionally protected.1"7 They have chosen,
whether for medical, moral, political or financial reasons, not to
perform abortions, and they cannot be forced to do so. When a
new patient registers, she is told that the particular doctor or the
office does not perform abortions, and if that is her need, she is
free to go elsewhere. There is no reason why doctors who will
not assist in suicide cannot inform their patients in a similar
manner.
Many doctors in fact do help their patients die, but because
of the law and social restrictions they have to do so quietly,
secretly, and in many ways fraudulently.
D.
In order tojustify a right to terminate treatment, judges and
medical ethicists have latched onto the alleged difference
between killing and letting die.10 8 In our first hypothetical, Adam
decided to stop treatment; he did not committ suicide, but died
from the underlying disease, while the doctor who turned off the
machine did not assist suicide. This may be a nice legal distinc-
tion, but I suggest it is a distinction without a difference. Adam
chooses to turn off the machine for a very deliberate purpose-
he wants to die, and in stopping the treatment he achieves his
goal, just as effectively as if he had put a gun to his head. More-
over, the doctor who accedes to Adam's wishes and turns off the
ventilator has assisted Adam in his purpose, just as if he had pro-
vided an overdose of barbiturates or injected a lethal substance.
The result is the same-a person has willed his death and with
the aid of a doctor has achieved that result.
Is the distinction between killing and letting die, between
active euthanasia and forgoing treatment, sufficiently clear that
one can build an ethical or legal rationale for sustaining it, or is
it merely a rationalization to avoid the hard issues?0 9 Two of the
country's leading biomedical ethicists, Tom L. Beauchamp and
James Childress suggest it is not, and use the 1982 case of "Baby
Doe" as an example. A newborn with Down syndrome needed
an operation to correct a tracheoesophageal fistula. The parents
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. According to the American Medical Association, "[w]hen a life-sus-
taining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily because of an underly-
ing disease." Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 93 (1994).
109. For what appear to me to be rationalizations, see RaymondJ. Devet-
tere, The Imprecise Language of Euthanasia and Causing Death, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS
268 (1990); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Doctors Must Not Kill, 3J. CLINICAL ETHICS 95
(1992).
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and attending physicians concluded that even if the operation
was successful, the child's future quality of life would be so poor
that survival was not in the infant's best interest. They decided
not to perform the operation and also chose to stop intravenous
feeding, so that the child would soon die from starvation. In
their minds the act of omission did not constitute killing; rather
the child died of the underlying condition. The case triggered a
public outcry, and critics charged that the parents and doctors
had killed the infant by negligently refusing to perform a duty
they owed to the child.11
To take another example, fifteen-month old Samuel Linares
had swallowed a balloon and had stopped breathing. His father
Rudy rushed the child to the nearest emergency room where the
doctors quickly removed the blockage, but the boy remained
unconscious, able to breathe only with the aid of a respirator.
Doctors determined that during the time Samuel had been
unable to breathe he had suffered brain damage; they told the
family that the child would never recover. For the next several
weeks the infant lay in a hospital room on a respirator, until his
father asked the hospital authorities to turn off the machine and
let his son die a natural death. Hospital officials refused, and
told him in effect that they were in charge, and if he did not like
it, he should get a lawyer and a court order. Linares pleaded
with the hospital and was shunted from one office to another; no
one paid him any attention."'
Finally, after nine months, Rudy Linares decided to release
his son from the machine. He came to the hospital armed with a
pistol, and holding off the staff, disconnected Samuel and then
held the child in his arms until he died, telling the doctors and
nurses he held at bay that he was doing this because he loved his
son. After Samuel died, Rudy laid down his gun. Police arrested
him, and the district attorney charged him with murder. The
charge outraged the public, and a few weeks later, a Cook
County grand jury refused to indict him.
What would one think if Linares had said: "I did not kill my
son. The balloon he swallowed killed him. All I did was let him
die from the underlying problem." While it is true that swallow-
ing the balloon led to the child's predicament, and that if left
alone (i.e., not put on a ventilator) he would have died, there is
also no question that his father, in a very real sense, "killed" him.
110. See BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 93, at 219-20.
111. In fact, under Illinois law the family had the right to order discontin-
uation of treatment, but Linares, a laborer, did not know the law or his rights in
the matter.
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What if the hospital authorities had behaved as they were
required to do under Illinois law, and upon the family's request
had removed Samuel from the machine? Would this have
changed the ethical dimensions in any meaningful way? It would
have amounted to "allowing to die," a situation condoned by law,
yet the end result is the same. What a physician did in Adam's
case and what Rudy Lenares did in that of his son is causally the
same-they removed a machine and as a result the patient died.
To take another one of our earlier hypotheticals, Carole
entered the hospital to be put on a morphine drip, knowing full
well that before long that treatment would end her life. The doc-
tor who administered the morphine also knew that increasing
the dosage would not only alleviate the pain, but lead to death.
In the eyes of the law and of the medical profession, Carole did
not commit suicide nor did her doctor kill her; she suffered from
cancer, and the doctor let her die. This may soothe the qualms of
the medical profession, but logic tells us that Carole willed her
death, and the doctorjoined in her enterprise; in fact, his actions
made it possible.
Should we therefore abandon the distinction between kill-
ing and letting die, and is there any reason to maintain the fic-
tion that refusal of treatment is somehow different than suicide?
Dan Brock has written:
The judgment of a person who competently decides to
commit suicide is essentially that "my expected future life,
under the best conditions possible for me, is so bad that I
judge it to be worse than no further continued life at all."
This seems to be in essence exactly the same judgment that
some persons who decide to forego life-sustaining treat-
ment make. The refusal of life-sustaining treatment is
their means of ending life; they intend to end their life
because of its grim prospects. Their death now when they
otherwise would not have died is self-inflicted, whether
they take a lethal potion or discontinue a respirator.
1 12
The person who discontinues dialysis or who takes an overdose of
barbiturates has chosen death, and has effectively committed sui-
cide no matter what the underlying illness may be. Similarly, the
person who provides a lethal overdose or who turns off the venti-
lator has helped to kill the person.
Does this mean that we should draw no distinctions among
doctors who deliberately, whether directly or indirectly, cause
death? Does it also mean that we should make no distinctions
112. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 93, at 224.
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between people who choose to die by their own hand, whether
by using a gun, taking an overdose or refusing life-sustaining
treatment? The answer is not as simple as the question might
make it appear. In law as in ethics, there are important distinc-
tions to be made. These distinctions may make it possible for us
to reach a principled basis for evaluating physician-assisted
suicide.
E.
First of all, even if we say that killing is the same as allowing
to die, there are moral distinctions to be made in killing. A per-
son who kills for hire is to be distinguished from a soldier who
kills in war, a racial lynching is different from someone who kills
in self-defense. A doctor who disconnects life-support from a ter-
minally ill patient is different from a doctor who fails or refuses
to act when a life could be saved. Neither killing or letting die is
by itself moral or immoral, but depends on the circumstances.
The law has for the past several centuries drawn distinctions
in homicide, and it has adopted a totality of the circumstances
approach in determining whether a killing is premeditated mur-
der or manslaughter or negligent homicide. Since about 1600,
judges have defined common-law crimes as requiring some sort
of bad intent, a guilty mind-mens rea-as well as an illegal act to
constitute a crime. Actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea-"An act
does not make one guilty unless one's mind is guilty." There are,
of course, differing degrees of knowledge about one's acts and
their consequences. We need to know something about whether
a person has acted maliciously or out of good intentions, whether
in acting a doctor has strayed beyond the limits of reasonable
behavior, whether what society considers normative has been
egregiously violated, and other factors.
Bright line tests do not work well here. The official position
of the American Medical Association that "physician-assisted sui-
cide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as
healer"'1 3 runs afoul the common-sense perception that many
doctors as well as laymen have that in some cases "healing," i.e.,
keeping alive, may not be in the patient's best interests. The
extreme case of the anonymous intern who decided to inject a
lethal solution into a suffering patient whom he did not know
certainly affronts us; what we do not know is whether that woman
was happy to see someone who could put an end to her pain.
113. AMA, CODE OF ETHicS Rule 2.211 (1994).
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The important thing is that we cannot generalize from one
case. Justifying a specific act of withdrawal of treatment or lethal
injection is not the same as justifying a policy of approving all
such acts. What is the mental state of the ill person? What are
the chances of recovery? Is the act one of humaneness or an
effort to save money? Did the person choosing to terminate
treatment act in a competent, knowing and voluntarily manner?
How much discretion, if any, do we wish to place in the hands of
physicians in such matters? How willing are we to honor the
principle of individual autonomy in practice as well as in theory?
If this sounds like situational ethics, it is, because I would
suggest that if one truly believes not only in individual autonomy
but also individual uniqueness, then a rigid rule, no matter how
appealing in its simplicity, cannot work. But can a code that tries
to take into account so many variables work? I believe it can, if
we allow common sense as well as common humanity to prevail.
Judges have for centuries weighed cases under a "totality of the
circumstances" ethic, determining that an act in one set of cir-
cumstances triggers a different legal response from that same
identical act in another setting. The rigidity of the law brought
equity into existence, to temper the law with mercy and thus
achieve justice. What is needed, I would suggest, is an ethics of
"equity" as well as a jurisprudence of compassion in this area.
III.
The debate over physician-assisted suicide in the United
States has operated on several levels, in courtrooms, newspapers,
scholarly journals and popular magazines; it certainly has not
been hidden, and there is evidence that popular attitudes are
changing. In a New York Times/CBS News poll taken in the
spring of 1990 on the question of whether a doctor should help a
terminally ill person die, fifty-three percent said yes, forty-two
percent said no, with the rest undecided. 14
Many years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that it is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." '115 The Supreme Court, while denying that a
constitutional right to assisted suicide exists, did not find a con-
stitutional barrier to it either, and made clear that if individual
114. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Giving Death a Hand: Pending Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1990, at A6.
115. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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states wanted to experiment in this area, they stood free to do so.
One country, the Netherlands, now allows physicians to help
their patients die. Is there anything we can learn from the Dutch
experience to allow us to formulate a workable public policy in
the United States? One state, Oregon, has chosen to legalize
assisted suicide under specific conditions. If other states follow,
what factors should they take into account in formulating their
policies? Is it possible to craft procedures that allow for maxi-
mum individual choice yet also establish legitimate safeguards
against abuse?
A.
In 1973, Dr. Geertruida Postma, a general practitioner in
the Netherlands, stood trial for the murder of her mother by
injection of morphine. The old lady lived in a nursing home,
had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage which left her partially para-
lyzed, was deaf and spoke with great difficulty, and at the time
was being treated for pneumonia. She had failed in a suicide
attempt, and told her daughter, "I want to leave this life. Please
help." At her trial, Dr. Postma declared that she regretted not
having done it earlier. The court found her guilty and sentenced
her to one week in jail and one year of probation.
Perhaps even more important, the court laid down guide-
lines under which assisted suicide would not be liable to criminal
sanction. These conditions required that the patient be suffering
from a terminal illness, be in unbearable pain, make a written
request to the doctor, have entered into "the dying phase," and
the assistance must be by a doctor, not a lay-person.1 1 6 The case
brought forth an out-pouring of statements from other physi-
cians that they would have done the same thing, and started the
Netherlands down a path where it became the only nation in the
world where euthanasia, while technically illegal, could be prac-
ticed openly.
The Dutch experience has been used by both sides in the
assisted suicide debate to reinforce their points. Supporters
point to the small number of deaths resulting from physician
action, while opponents declare that the practice has grown out
of control, with many people involuntarily dying at the hands of
doctors. One needs to understand how euthanasia works in the
Netherlands, but one needs to keep in mind that the United
States is a far different country, and it is questionable whether
116. See CHARLEs F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE
CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 28-36 (1991); DEREK HUMPHREY, LAWFUL EXIT: THE
LIMITS OF FREEDOM FOR HELP IN DYING ch. 2 (1993).
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one can actually apply the Dutch experience to the American
environment.
1 17
Nearly all analyses of the Dutch experience start with World
War II, when the Germans occupied Holland for nearly five
years. The Nazi satraps ordered the local doctors to help carry
out their policies of sterilizing Jews, euthanizing the handi-
capped, and deporting Jews and other "undesirables" to labor
camps. Alone of all the occupied countries, the Dutch medical
profession as a group refused to participate in the Nazi atrocities.
As a result, the Germans voided all of the Dutch medical licenses,
but the doctors continued to treat patients while no longer sign-
ing birth and death certificates. To force compliance, the Nazis
arrested one-hundred doctors and deported them to labor
camps in Germany; but the Dutch held firm and refused to col-
laborate; eventually the occupiers gave up. As a result of this
experience, no one in Holland considers the doctors butchers or
murderers, and charges of physicians "playing God" with
patients' lives are pretty much absent from the Dutch debate
(although not from the charges of those outside the Netherlands
who condemn euthanasia).
1 1 8
Following the Postma decision, over the next twenty years a
series of court rulings helped to refine what might be called the
"unofficial" policy regarding physician-assisted suicide in the
Netherlands, since technically the Dutch penal code still consid-
ers euthanasia a crime.1 1 9 Most of these cases came to the court
more in an effort to develop a policy rather than to punish indi-
vidual doctors. In this sense they resemble the collusive cases
brought by hospitals and doctors in the United States to develop
a legally sanctioned policy of allowing patients to terminate life
support.
The crucial case involved a physician who had, at her
request, helped a very sick and elderly woman to die. The case
went all the way to the Supreme Court, which in 1984 sent it back
to the Rotterdam local court for a rehearing. There, the judges
117. The most comprehensive and recent survey of euthanasia in the
Netherlands is ASKING To DIE: INSIDE THE DUTCH DEBATE ABOUT EUTHANASIA
(David C. Thomas et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter ASKING TO DIE].
118. See HUMPHREY, supra note 116.
119. There is a move to legalize the current practice, but as of this writing
the Dutch legislature had not acted. Sections 293 and 294 of the Dutch penal
code make physician-assisted death a crime. Dutch courts have rationalized
their not punishing doctors on the grounds that the physician's duty to act in a
patient's best interests conflicts with the duty to obey the law. See Helga Kuhse,
The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 145, 146-
47 (1989).
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enunciated the so-called "Rotterdam criteria" which narrowed
the circumstances under which physician-assisted suicide would
be permissible. The patient's death may not cause unnecessary
suffering for others; following a patient's request the physician
must consult the patient's family, unless the patient objects; and
a second doctor had to agree with the prognosis.
1 20
That same year the Royal Dutch Medical Society announced
its approval of physician-assisted dying, and set out "Rules of
Careful Conduct" to guide doctors. 21 The Rotterdam criteria
and the blessing of the organized professional body created a cli-
mate in which doctors could help end the lives of their patients
without fear of prosecution. But a critical ingredient went miss-
ing. Under the guidelines doctors had to turn in extensive
reports about the circumstances of deaths they aided, and stand
ready to be interviewed by an investigator from the Ministry of
Justice if any thing seemed out of the ordinary. As busy men and
women, doctors often avoided the lengthy paperwork by signing
death certificates listing the underlying cause of death, such as
cancer, and neglecting to add that the death had been hastened
by drugs.
As a result, the Ministry of Justice initially received only
about a dozen reports a year of euthanasia, although the number
increased as physicians grew more familiar with the practice.
Because of conflicting information, the Dutch government, in
1990, named a special commission headed by ProfessorJan Rem-
melink, the attorney general of the Dutch Supreme Court. The
Remmelink Commission undertook a careful nationwide study of
euthanasia in the Netherlands, and the following year reported
its findings. In a country of 15,000,000 people, there had been
roughly 130,000 deaths in 1990. Extrapolating from official
reports as well as interviews with doctors, the Commission esti-
mated that 2,300 deaths, 1.8 percent of the total, had resulted
from euthanasia, while another 400 could be classified as physi-
cian-assisted suicide. However, only 486 of these deaths had
been reported on the death certificate as euthanasia or assisted
suicide. In nearly all of the 2,700 cases, however, the guidelines
established by the Rotterdam court as well as by the Medical Soci-
ety had been met, with the obvious exception of reporting. 122
120. See Nurit Lev, The Legalization of Euthanasia: The Right to Die or the Duty
to Die, 19 SUvoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 297, 300 (1995).
121. See Johan Legemaate, Twenty-Five Years of Dutch Experience and Policy
on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: An Overview, in ASKING TO DIE, supra note 117,
at 21.
122. See MEDICAL DECISIONS ABOUT THE END OF LIFE: REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION TO STUDY THE MEDICAL PRACTlCE CONCERNING EUrHANASIA (1991).
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The Remmelink group did, however, uncover one dis-
turbing feature of the Dutch practice. In an additional 1,000
cases, the patient had not been competent when the doctor had
injected the drugs, raising questions about whether the family
had been involved or if the doctor had arbitrarily and solely
decided on the procedure. (The Dutch do not use the term
"euthanasia" for such cases, reserving it solely for instances in
which the patient voluntarily requested the doctor to act.) For
opponents of assisted suicide, these deaths clearly pointed to
physician abuse, and they direly warned of the slippery slope in
which doctors would choose who would live and who would die,
a Nazi-like extermination of the very old, the very young, the sick
and the disabled, or those whose illnesses placed heavy financial
or emotional burdens on their families.
The Dutch investigators did look closely at these 1,000 cases,
and did not come to such a frightful conclusion. Over half of the
patients had previously while competent expressed an interest in
euthanasia, and most were moribund at the time of the lethal
injections. This information, however, came from doctor inter-
views, and while one might surmise that in a majority of the
instances the actions probably would have been approved by the
patients if they had been able to voice their sentiments, one can
also conclude that there were some cases of involuntary euthana-
sia. Whether the incidence of such abuse is greater in the
Netherlands than elsewhere is impossible to say. The vast major-
ity of deaths in the United States are not investigated, nor are
there autopsies except under suspicious circumstances. A very
sick person dies, the attending physician signs a certificate attrib-
uting death to the disease, and that is the end of the matter.
Anecdotal information as well as some surveys indicate that in at
least some instances doctors hastened death, and without the
open consent of the patient.
To supporters of physician-assisted suicide, the Remmelink
findings proved reassuring. The number of euthanasia and
assisted suicide deaths accounted for only a small fraction (2.1
percent) of the total deaths in the country; even if one added in
the estimated 1,000 non-voluntary deaths, the total still
amounted to less than three percent. Moreover, doctors did not
practice euthanasia on all who requested it; physicians acceded
to only one request in three. As far as could be determined, doc-
tors euthanized only persons in the terminal stage of illness;
eighty-seven percent of the patients had been expected to die
within a week, and another twelve percent within a month.
One of the main concerns of opponents of euthanasia, as
well as the stated policy of American medical associations, is the
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effect that such practice will have on physicians. Giving doctors
legal power to end life, they claim, subverts the entire basis of the
healing arts, and will demean not only the profession but dehu-
manize doctors as well. For evidence, they point to the Dutch
Pediatric Association, which in 1992, issued guidelines on how
physicians should handle the euthanasia of children and
newborns. In deciding whether to end the life of a severely
handicapped newborn, doctors would judge the expected quality
of life for the infant, and if prospects seemed dim that the child
could lead even a semblance of a normal life, then euthanasia
would be justified. 1 3 In February 1993, the Ministry of Justice
proposed expanding guidelines to allow doctors to perform
"active medical intervention to cut short life without an express
request. 1124 In April of the same year, a court formally approved
the euthanasia of psychiatric patients, after a doctor helped end
the life of a woman who stated that she wanted to die after losing
two of her children and going through a divorce.
In 1995, a second nationwide investigation, consisting of two
major studies, followed up on the original Remmelink report
and seemed to cut the ground from under the slippery slope
argument. One study compared practices in 1995 to those in
1990, while the second sought to assess the notification proce-
dure which had been formulated by the Ministry of Justice and
the Royal Dutch Medical Association in the early 1990s and
which had been enacted into law in 1994.
The first study team, led by Paul J. van der Maas, found that
practices in 1995 differed little from those in 1990. Euthanasia
had become somewhat more frequent, but they attributed this to
the aging of the population as well as an increase in mortality
from cancer, the usual underlying disease in cases of euthanasia.
Physician-assisted suicide remained rare according to van der
Maas because it is slower than euthanasia and because the Dutch
draw no moral distinction between the two. As in 1990, nearly all
of the euthanasia cases involved patients suffering from terminal
sickness with only a short time left to live. The number of cases
in which the patient did not explicitly request the doctor to act
declined somewhat from 1990. The report concluded that the
Netherlands had not started down a slippery slope, and that
123. See Abner Katzman, Dutch Debate Means Killing of Babies, Co N
COSTA TIMES, July 30, 1992, at 3B.
124. Critics Fear Euthanasia Soon Needn't Be Requested, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb.
17, 1993, at A10.
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Dutch doctors continued to practice euthanasia carefully and
only under compelling circumstances.
125
The second study showed that the incidence of doctors
reporting euthanasia or assisted suicide had risen from eighteen
percent in 1990 to forty-one percent in 1995, indicating that a
majority of the cases still went unreported. While agreeing with
the need for some form of oversight, the medical profession
found burdensome the multiple levels of legal review, and also
resented the fact that euthanasia technically remained a crime,
despite the official guidelines. For many doctors, even the slight-
est chance of criminal prosecution, or even investigation by the
Ministry of Justice, justified attributing death to an underlying
illness rather than to euthanasia.
1 26
What effect does practicing euthanasia have on Dutch doc-
tors? Have they become Nazi-like arbiters of death for the aged
and infirm, or have they expanded the role of physician to
include compassionate end-of-life treatment? The relatively low
incidence of euthanasia would seem to negate the first view,
although the number of involuntary cases would indicate that
some doctors have chosen to act on their own. However, this
arrogation of power is not limited to doctors in the Netherlands.
In the United States, about seventy percent of hospital deaths
occur after a decision has been made, sometimes by the family,
sometimes by the family and the doctor, and in some cases by the
doctor alone, to forego further treatment; in the Netherlands
that figure is only twenty percent. In addition, both countries
allow the use of morphine and other opioids to treat pain in
doses that could lead to death, the so-called "double effect." The
Dutch are just much more open about what they are doing.
Probably the one aspect about the practice that vexes most
doctors is the reporting requirement and the fact that their deci-
sions to help patients end their lives, decisions based on knowl-
edge of the patient and of the disease, are reviewed by non-
medical bureaucrats. About three-fifths of all physician-assisted
deaths go unreported, with doctors claiming that they want to
spare the patient families and themselves the scrutiny of an
inquiry. Since 1981, only twenty doctors have been prosecuted
for violating the guidelines, and only six have received prison
125. See Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide,
and Other Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995,
335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996).
126. See Gerrit van der Wal et al., Evaluation of Notification Procedures for
Physician-Assisted Death in the Netherlands, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1996).
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sentences-all suspended. 127 By any standards, doctors have not
abused the system in any significant way.
B.
While many people see the Dutch way as the future for the
United States, a closer analysis of the medical culture in Holland
suggests that the model may not transfer easily across the ocean.
The Netherlands is a small country, prosperous, technologically
advanced, democratic, and with a well-educated citizenry. But it
is not a miniature version of the United States. It has some fif-
teen million people living in an area smaller than West Virginia,
and ninety-six percent of them are white and native-born. While
there is a rich religious diversity, the different groups coexist
peacefully and enjoy a long tradition of tolerance. The Catholic
and Protestant political parties are both centrist, and the Dutch
Catholic Church has long been known for its independence
from the more conservative pronouncements of the Vatican.
In a country in which most people are comfortable middle
class, there is also an extensive state welfare system in place.
Nearly everyone in the small country is covered by either govern-
ment or private health insurance that pays practically all medical
expenses, thus alleviating the patient's fear of becoming a finan-
cial burden upon one's family. Even nursing homes are funded
by the government and are available to everyone. Dr. Herbert
Cohen, who is regarded by many as the archetype of the compas-
sionate doctor practicing euthanasia, says that physician-assisted
death "is not a way out of social misery. You don't have to
request euthanasia because you can't get any medical atten-
tion."128 In the United States, where one out of six persons has
no health insurance of any sort and millions more lack full cover-
age, hospitalization and nursing home care can impoverish a
family. The people of Holland face practically no out-of-pocket
expenses at the end of life.
1 29
In the United States, there is one general practitioner for
every 6.5 specialists; in the Netherlands the ratio is one to one
and a half. Dutch GPs live in the neighborhood of their patients,
their offices are in their homes, and they make house calls when
their patients are too sick to come to the office. There is a close
relationship between the doctors and their patients, many of
whom they have treated for decades, a relationship strikingly sim-
127. SeeJoseph R. Shapiro, Euthanasia's Home, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 24, 26-27.
128. Id. at 26.
129. See id.
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ilar to what health care used to be in the United States before it
became so technological and hospital-centered. 3 0
If anything the trusting relationship between doctor and
patient is one reason that the Dutch policy works. The doctor
does not come in when a patient asks for euthanasia, give an
injection, and leave. In 1994, Netherlands television broadcast
an actual euthanasia, and it showed Dr. Wilfred van Oijen visiting
his patient, Cornelis van Wednel de Joode, who suffered from
ALS, a number of times, and Dr. van Oijeb stayed with de Joode
and his wife throughout the final act."' To give another exam-
ple, when Andrea de Lang chose to end her life because of the
pain and debilitating effects of pancreatic cancer, her doctor
stayed the entire night in her apartment with her husband, three
grown children, a sister and other friends. In Holland, forty per-
cent of all deaths take place in the home, compared to only fif-
teen percent in the United States.'" 2
Holland has been described as a "consensus" society.
Because there is some significant opposition to euthanasia, the
practice remains illegal on the books. At the same time there are
official guidelines for doctors and public officials to follow.
Dutch ethicist Evert Van Leeuwen thinks that the consensus
among the citizenry is what makes the practice work, and that the
type of physician-assisted suicide that would ultimately be consid-
ered in the U.S. Supreme Court would never work in Holland.
Patients cannot "demand" euthanasia, but rather must work it
out with their doctors as partners in the decision process. "We
do not talk in terms of rights," he says. Only about a third of
those who request euthanasia get it, and unlike the United
States, the other sixty-three percent do not go to courts.
33
The practice of euthanasia appears to be growing in the
Netherlands. Although the percentage of deaths caused by
euthanasia remained relatively constant, requests for ending life
jumped nearly forty percent between 1990 and 1995, and has
been common among those infected by the AIDS virus. The
majority of requests come from people between the ages of
thirty-five and seventy who have cancer.1
3 1
Some Dutch believe that their acceptance of euthanasia as a
socially useful and humane practice stems from their strong
belief in individual autonomy, and interviews of those choosing
130. See FILENE, supra note 17, at 208-09; Shapiro, supra note 127, at 26.
131. See Helping a Man Kill Himself, As Shown on Dutch TV, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1994, at Al.
132. See FILENE, supra note 17, at 209.
133. See Shapiro, supra note 127, at 25.
134. See id. at 26.
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to end their lives indicate that it is not the pain that is the driving
force behind their decision, but their desire to control their lives,
to go out when they choose and in a manner they deem respect-
ful of human dignity. The people of Holland see euthanasia as
an aspect of medical care, and like other medical procedures,
needs to be entered into carefully and with the guidance of a
physician.
The United States has a much different culture. It is geo-
graphically large and its nearly 300 million people are diverse in
race, creed and ethnic origin. It is a contentious rather than a
consensus society, and in recent years there has been a growth of
divisive forces fighting over a large number of issues. Regretta-
bly, the debate has often been vitriolic with neither side willing to
accept a compromise position. Perhaps the best example of this
is abortion, into which have been woven all the volatile elements
of the women's movement, religious and political fundamental-
ism, and a host of other concerns. As some commentators have
argued, America is in the grips of a culture war, and physician-
assisted suicide is one of the flashpoints.
The debate has been framed in terms of rights, and the
phrase "right to die," which may mean different things to differ-
ent groups, has nonetheless passed into the common lexicon.
Where the Dutch approach the issue as a matter of medical prac-
tice, in the United States it comes in the raiment of politics and
law.
C.
Even before Glucksberg and Quill began their trek to the high
court, several advocacy groups, sensing growing public support,
tried to by-pass hostile state legislatures and make physician-
assisted suicide law through the state-wide referenda. A series of
votes in western states in particular demonstrates vividly not only
how opinions are changing but how open a debate this has
been. In November 1991, voters went to the polls in the State of
Washington to cast their ballots on Initiative 119. Entitled a
"death with dignity" measure, the proposal would have author-
ized doctors to administer lethal injections to incurably ill
patients. The patient had to make the request in writing, and
had to have been diagnosed by two doctors as having less than six
months to live. Two impartial persons, not members of the
patients' family, had to witness the written request. If 119 had
passed, the state would have become the first jurisdiction in the
world to legalize a form of euthanasia.
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The Hemlock Society provided the major backing for 119,
arguing that the proposal would provide terminally ill people
with freedom of choice. Both proponents and opponents of the
initiative flooded the state with media spots. In one ad, a hospice
worker charged that "Initiative 119 would let doctors kill my
patients," while in another a woman who been diagnosed as hav-
ing cancer seven years earlier told how glad she was to still be
alive. Yes, there had been some rough moments, and if 119 had
been in effect, she might have chosen death; but she was so
happy to still be alive.
Supporters of the measure ran equally emotional ads, with
stories of people who died agonizing deaths. One woman, Vera
Belt, told how her mother had died in great pain from throat
cancer after doctors had refused her pleas for help in ending her
life. When Ms. Belt's sister became similarly ill, she knew what
awaited her, so she killed herself by putting a gun in her mouth
and pulling the trigger.
The proposal split religious and medical groups. The Cath-
olic Church strongly opposed the measure, but more than 200
Protestant ministers from mainstream and liberal groups
endorsed it. United Church of Christ minister Dale Turner, a
supporter of 119, declared that "We're on the frontier of the
world," and he dismissed concerns that people would too readily
choose suicide if it became so easily available. Turner, seventy-
four, said that "Nobody loves life like an old man. A person has
to be pretty ill and desperate to want to leave. 13 5
Many doctors bitterly fought the proposal. They had been
trained to save lives, not to take them, and they saw 119 as open-
ing the doors to a flood of abuse. When the Washington State
Medical Society debated the issue, delegates voted five to one
against it, but a poll of the general membership showed doctors
split roughly evenly.1 36 Although early signs indicated that Initia-
tive 119 would pass, opponents gained ground as election day
approached. Critics claim that American voters are apathetic,
but 119 galvanized the populace, and voters came out in large
numbers. The initiative failed by a eight percent margin. Both
sides agreed that the debate had been useful, and that an impor-
tant public policy issue had been raised, one that would not qui-
etly go away. "If we don't deal with the problems raised by 119,
we'll be facing this issue again and again and again" said Dr.
Peter McGough, an opponent of the measure. "Saying 'No' to
135. WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at A6, 7.
136. See Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes toward Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEw ENG.J. MED. 89 (1994).
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assisted death is not enough. Now we have a responsibility to
deal with the problems that brought out this concern. '
In November 1992 a measure similar to Washington's Initia-
tive 119 went down to defeat in California, by an identical mar-
gin, eight percent. 38 The Hemlock Society, encouraged by the
large number of voters supporting its position in Washington
and California, decided to try again, this time in Oregon. In
November 1994, Oregon voters, by a margin of 627,980 to
596,018, passed Measure 16, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
becoming the first jurisdiction in the world to make assisted sui-
cide legal."39 The Oregon initiative was more carefully con-
structed than the measures that went down to defeat in its
neighboring states. To safeguard against abuses, the act applies
only in the last six months of life, mandates a second opinion
about the patient's condition from another doctor, requires mul-
tiples requests, has two waiting periods, and limits the type of aid
that a physician can offer to prescribing but not administering
medication.
Despite an intense debate and spirited opposition similar to
that in Washington, Measure 16 passed because of four things.
First, the Washington initiative had been the first to reach the
ballot, and it met a stronger and more combative opposition
than its sponsors had been prepared to face. Second, the Ore-
gon measure contained additional safeguards that blunted many
of the charges that had been raised in Washington. Most impor-
tant, Oregon had long been a progressive state, and its western
tradition prized individualism. The notion of a person control-
ling his or her own fate appealed to many Oregonians. Finally,
the Oregon medical profession, unlike that in Washington,
decided to stay neutral in the campaign. Oregon doctors broke
with the national office of the American Medical Association
(which opposed Measure 16), because, after a heated debate, the
state's medical association could find no consensus among its
members.
Almost immediately after passage of Measure 16, a group of
physicians, patients and hospitals challenged the law on the
grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the First
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The gist of
their complaint was that Measure 16 denied terminally ill
137. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16.
138. See id. at B8.
139. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 - .897 (2000); see also Lee v. Oregon, 107
F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997).
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patients the same type of safeguards against committing suicide
under undue influence or while suffering from depression as
that provided for non-terminally ill people. 140  Chief Judge
Michael R. Hogan found numerous inadequacies in the act's
protections for the terminally ill,14 1 no rational basis for the dis-
tinction between terminally ill and non-terminally ill,142 and con-
cluded that the act did violate the Equal Protection Clause.
1 4
1
The state appealed, and in a relatively brief opinion, Circuit
Judge Melvin Brunetti vacated the lower court ruling, on
grounds that the claims were not yet ripe and the plaintiffs had
no standing.
144
On March 24, 1998, a woman in her mid-eighties became
the first person in Oregon to commit suicide with the legal assist-
ance of a doctor. The woman, whose identity was kept secret
under terms of the state law, suffered from breast cancer and,
according to her doctor, had less than two months to live. She
had been having increasing difficulty in breathing, and could no
longer enjoy the simple pleasures that had meant so much to
her, such as gardening. Hannah Davidson, with the Oregon
Death With Dignity Legal Defense and Education Fund, noted
that a death is not a reason to celebrate, "but it is good for us. It
was a personal decision, and it showed that the law worked."
Opponents predictably denounced the event. Gayle Atteberry,
executive director of Oregon Right to Life, issued a statement
saying, "This marks the first day in history when a society sits idly
by and lets someone kill themselves with the help of a doctor." '145
Oregon medical groups did not comment.
Predictions that Oregon would become a beacon for the sui-
cidal, or start the nation down the slippery slope to mass death,
have not materialized. In fact, relatively few people have exer-
cised their rights under this law. At the end of August 1998, ten
months after the law went into effect, only eight people had died
from lethal drugs prescribed by a physician. Two others had
secured prescriptions, but succumbed to their illness before
using the medication. Nine of the ten suffered from cancer, and
140. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431.
141. See id. at 1434-37.
142. See id. at 1434.
143. See id. at 1437.
144. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The case had been
argued before the Ninth Circuit panel on July 9, 1996, but the court had with-
held judgment once it learned that the Supreme Court had accepted two cases
dealing with assisted suicide.
145. William Booth, Woman Commits Doctor-Aided Suicide, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 26, 1998, at A7.
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the other had heart problems. There were five men and five
women, with an average age of seventy-one.146 In the last year for
which figures are available, only fifteen people committed sui-
cide with a doctor's help.
14 7
It is too early to tell how the Oregon program will work.
Although Measure 16 is fairly specific, there are a number of
technical problems to be resolved. Doctors are still discussing
how a patient's request for lethal medication should be honored.
Pharmacists, who are often called upon by customers for infor-
mation about medications, wonder what advice they should give
to persons who hand them prescriptions for lethal drug dosages
and whether any liability will attach in filling these prescriptions.
The law provides for adult Oregon residents, but how is that to
be defined and will that definition conflict with federal and con-
stitutional provisions about residency? Will other options, such
as hospice care, be ignored by people for whom that may be the
best choice?14
Even those who favor physician-assisted suicide recognize
that there are many potential problems. Doctors educated to
save lives as their primary concern will have to learn new skills
and attitudes. Dr. Martin Skinner, an internist in suburban Port-
land, had mixed feelings about Measure 16. "I don't know how
to deal with it," he told a reporter. "I can conceive of myself
being in a position to make such a decision, but I honestly do not
know what I would do. '149 The law's definition of a terminally ill
patient, one with six months or less to live, is also problematic.
According to Skinner, doctors are fairly accurate in determining
how long someone has to live when the illness is cancer, but
there is far less certainty with other diseases.'50 There is also con-
cern about how the law will affect the vulnerable, one of the
main concerns that led Judge Hogan initially to block Measure
16's implementation. Will there be undue pressure on elderly
patients, whose illness is a financial and emotional drain on their
families, to do the "right" thing and opt for suicide? Arthur
Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine, could not predict what the
exact consequences of the Oregon initiative would be, but he
declared that the "legalization of any form of assisted suicide will
146. See Eight in Oregon Used Suicide Law to Die, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug.
19, 1998, at A2.
147. See Painful Debate, TIME, Sept. 27, 1999, at 44.
148. See The Uncharted Waters of Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law, 4 CHoicEs 1, 6
(1995).
149. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at B14.
150. See id.
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Although the social, political and economic contexts in
which physician-assisted death takes place in the Netherlands are
much different than those in the United States, I believe there is
at least one lesson that can be learned. The predictions that doc-
tors will be dehumanized, that the medical profession will fall
into disrepute, and that death will become a casual matter have
certainly not been born out in Holland. If anything, the fact that
one can turn to a doctor to ease the final pain and suffering has
enlarged the respect in which the Dutch hold doctors. That
there are some abuses in the system is undeniable, but certainly
these are no greater than abuses reported in the American sys-
tem of health care delivery.
Oregon is now embarked on an experiment, and initial
reports do not indicate any great rush of people to hasten their
death. To critics of physician-assisted suicide, even a single doc-
tor helping a single patient hasten the moment of death is an
abuse. Supporters of the plan will not cheer death, but they will
point out that personal autonomy is honored within a system
designed to prevent mistreatment.
If one were asked to design a system that would allow greater
end-of-life choices, including physician-assisted suicide, what
would be the policy imperatives one would want to take into
account? This is certainly not a new question, and has been grap-
pled with before by doctors and medical ethicists, Margaret Bat-
tin, for example, has posed seventeen questions physicians and
mental health professionals should ask when dealing with
requests for assistance in suicide, such as, "Is the request consis-
tent with the person's basic values?" "Are the medical facts cited
in the request accurate?" "Has the person considered the effects
of his or her suicide on other persons?"152 But these are the
questions that doctors should ask. What are the larger safe-
guards that a legislature should take into account if it wanted to
establish a system of legalized physician-assisted suicide?
Only persons within six months of expected death will be eligible
to request physician-assisted death. While no one can predict the
exact moment of death, the medical profession has sufficient
151. Id. at A28.
152. BATrIN, supra note 93, ch. 13; see also Howard Brody, Care of the Hope-
lessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1380 (1992).
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experience with AIDS, cancer, ALS and other such diseases that
its practitioners can make well-educated estimates as to how
much time a person has left to live.
The decision must be completely voluntary. There are a vari-
ety of safeguards that can be erected to ensure this, such as
requiring a request for physician-assisted suicide to be made at
least twice, both orally and in writing with a certain time period
elapsing between each request; that the request be witnessed by
at least one physician or qualified health-care professional other
than the attending physician,
The patient making the request be competent. This require-
ment means not only that the patient understand the conse-
quences of the act, but be mentally able to make a decision. If
the person is suffering from acute depression, is mentally inca-
pacitated in some way, then he or she will not qualify. One
might note that there is a long legal experience in judging com-
petency that can be brought to bear here, including, if necessary,
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to determine compe-
tency.
If a person fears that some future event may result in inabil-
ity to act, then a living will may provide for a health care proxy to
make a request for assisted death. At present we allow a living
will to govern decisions not to resuscitate and to take patients off
life-support equipment. However, a person may not be on life
support and yet may be reduced to a vegetable-like existence
which she would not want. This provision will allow a proxy to
act, with a properly executed legal instrument serving as proof of
both voluntariness and competency. It will also negate the six-
month requirement of item one.
Once a person has been adjudged to have met the above
requirements, he or she may obtain a lethal dose of drugs after a
fourteen-day waiting period.
No physician will be required to administer the drugs or be present at
the time of the suicide. However, if a relationship exists between the
physician and the patient, such as personal friendship or a
lengthy professional tie, if the doctor is willing to assist personally
in administering drugs or a lethal injection, and be present at the
time of the suicide, no legal liability shall attach to these actions.
Record keeping must be accurate. Both the patient and the phy-
sician must fill out appropriate forms and register them with the
appropriate state or local office. If the procedures have been
duly followed and the forms submitted, then no legal liability,
either civil or criminal, shall attach to the physician or to any
family members or friends who assist the patient.
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A person who meets these criteria and commits suicide will
have two entries on her death certificate--physician-assisted suicide as
well as the underlying disease. In such cases, insurance compa-
nies will not be permitted to invoke the standard suicide clause
in their policies.
These criteria are not meant to be exhaustive. Providing the
state does not impose limitations burdensome to the individual,
it may require additional safeguards, such as a sworn affidavit to a
proper magistrate. The idea is not to make assisted suicide easy,
but rather in appropriate situations to make it possible with suffi-
cient safeguards yet a respect for individual autonomy.
The one group for whom these criteria may prove both bur-
densome and unhelpful consists of people who are suffering
from a severely painful condition, but one that is not life-threat-
ening. One might well ask why these people should not
included, and the answer may very well be that they should be.
But there are practical difficulties associated with pain; it is diffi-
cult for doctors to gauge the extent of the pain, or how it affects
the ability of the person to function in a normal manner. At least
for the moment, I should prefer to limit physician-assisted sui-
cide to those whom medical experience pronounce to be near
the end of their lives, and to see how the system operates. I
would not object in theory to extending the system to these peo-
ple, but see many practical difficulties.
The sixth standard is there, not for the patient's safety, but
for the doctor's peace of mind. Given the way medicine is prac-
ticed in the United States today, far fewer people have personal
or long-term relationships with their doctor as existed a genera-
tion or two ago. We have become an urbanized nation, and the
social ties that existed in small towns, where the family doctor did
in fact treat everything from birth to death, have in most places
disappeared. This is a shame, for as Charles Baron wrote:
Ending one's life in solitude can be a lonely and frighten-
ing undertaking, fraught with uncertainty, ambivalence,
and opportunities for failure. We hope the responsible
physician will be present at the patient's death in order to
reassure the patient and to make certain that the process is
carried out effectively.15
One hears the words of Justice Souter here, that without a doc-
tor's assistance "the patient's right will often be confined to
crude methods of causing death." '154
153. Charles Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21 (1996).
154. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 778 (1997).
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One consideration that will be offensive to many people is
cost, and there are few ethicists writing today who seem willing to
discuss this matter. Permitting physician-assisted suicide could
mean huge savings in medical expenses at the end of life. The
person suffering from cancer who has to spend weeks or months
in a hospital or even on a morphine drop runs up a large bill,
and whether it is paid for by insurance, the family or a state assist-
ance program, it is a cost that must be borne. Obviously, no one
is suggesting that such persons simply be put to death to save
money, but considerations of public policy do require that costs
be looked at.
Various studies indicate that eighty or more percent of a per-
son's lifetime medical expenses occur in the last year of life.
Clearly, if one knew that a disease was terminal, and that death
would come sooner or later, he or she might well choose to end
life and save the family the financial as well as the emotional
costs associated with a long illness. But while allowing people to
terminate their lives earlier would mean significant savings to
some families and to the insurers, would it mean a great deal in
terms of society's overall medical costs? Margaret Battin has
argued that if the person voluntarily chooses to end life rather
than suffer from a deteriorative illness, and that if in making this
choice the person factors in monetary costs, it is a legitimate con-
cern. 155 But, as noted above, one of the safeguards one would
want in such a system is a means to ensure that such decisions are
truly voluntary. If a patient decides that he would rather not live
for another two or three months suffering from ceaseless pain,
tied to machinery in a hospital, and if he wants to take into
account what the costs of this health care would be to his family,
that is a legitimate consideration, and no different from other
decisions during a lifetime in which costs play a significant role.
But, according to figures Battin and Ezekial Emanuel have
compiled, the actual savings in total health care costs to the
nation would be at most 1/100th of the U.S. health care budget,
and perhaps as little as 1/900th. "The smallness of this figure,"
she claims, "ought to silence talk of costs in discussions of the
morality of physician-assisted suicide." '56 Perhaps, but the one
area where one should fear a slippery slope is in the area of costs,
where insurers and health-care providers will be looking for ways
to cut costs and maximize limited resources to serve as many peo-
ple as possible. So far, no court has been willing to grant a hospi-
tal permission to take a patient in a persistent vegetative state off
155. See MARGARET PAST BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 210 (1995).
156. Id. at 211.
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life support when the patient or the patient's family is
opposed. 157 One must ensure that all end of life decisions are
carefully circumscribed to make sure that autonomy is respected.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if one believes that individual autonomy must
be respected, then unless a person is legally incompetent or mis-
informed, then that person's wishes ought to be, if at all possible,
honored.
If a person finds that life is no longer worth living because of
pain and suffering caused by illness, that judgment should be
determinative. Here, of course, all forms of appropriate treat-
ment must be offered, but if the patient decides that a particular
therapy would have little chance of success and do little more
than cause additional pain, or that heavy medication will relieve
pain but lead to a vegetable-like existence, that decision-if
made with full knowledge of the facts and of the consequences-
should be honored.
If a person wants to end his life under these conditions, if
appropriate safeguards are built into the process, and if the
attending physician is willing to cooperate, I see no ethical or
public policy reasons why this person should not be allowed to
end his suffering and control the details of his death. That there
are dangers in such a policy is undeniable, but so far, the experi-
ence of the Netherlands and of Oregon would seem to indicate
that abuses can be minimized. That some people may be
offended is also undeniable, but there is no justifiable reason why
one religion or one group or one individual should be able to
impose their views on others.
A system with appropriate safeguards will not be perfect, but
perfection is not required. What is needed is a means by which
competent individuals, fully informed of the facts and of the con-
sequences of their decisions, may, if they choose end their pain
and suffering in a manner consistent with human dignity.
What we do not need is an effort to cut short the experiment
that has now begun. It took several years for Oregon to decide to
permit physician-assisted suicide, and the voters of that state
twice approved the necessary implementing legislation. Other
states are now waiting to see how the Oregon experiment works,
and whether they should adopt it as well. This is how the federal
system in the United States should work. But once again, foes of
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assisted suicide, led by religious conservative groups as well as the
Catholic Church, are attempting to impose their views in lieu of
those of the people.
In September, the House Judiciary Committee passed a bill
that would outlaw assisted suicide. The so-called Pain Relief Pro-
motion Act would send doctors to jail for life for prescribing con-
trolled substances with the intent of hastening death. The bill
has not appeared on the House floor as of this writing, but Ore-
gon Senator Ron Wyden has promised a filibuster in the upper
house should it ever get that far. The bill is, from all aspects, a
terrible proposal. Supposedly, it will encourage doctors to
aggressively treat pain, and physicians would not be prosecuted if
they "accidentally" killed patients through massive doses of pain-
killers, such as opioids. But patient advocates say it will be impos-
sible to determine if a death caused by painkillers was intentional
or not, and the experience of intermeddling busybodies in the
case of infant treatment would promise that each case would lead
to demands for police investigation."' 8
In the matter of assisted suicide, one should keep in mind
Louis Brandeis's great statement that it "is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' 5 9
Brandeis had great faith in the wisdom of the people, and were
he alive today, whatever his personal feelings, would have
defended the people of Oregon in their social experiment.
Clearly those who claim to hold life more dear than anything else
lack this same faith in democracy, and believe that their views are
correct and should be imposed on everyone. That, I would sug-
gest, is in no case a proper way to frame public policy.
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